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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the validity of certification and insider selling 
hypotheses within the context of new issues. Comparisons of venture 
capital backed and non venture-backed issues with similar offering 
characteristics show that issuers with venture capital affiliation are more 
underpriced than non venture-backed IPOs and insider selling results in 
decreased underpricing. These results contradict the findings of previous 
venture capital certification studies {Barry (1990), Megginson and Weiss 
(1991), and Lin and Smith (1997)}, but are consistent with recent work 
that examines grandstanding {Lee and Wahal (2002)} and insider selling 
decisions during hot market periods {Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)}.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
 The topic of venture capitalist involvement with initial public offerings has 
garnered much attention in contemporary finance research. The bulk of academic studies 
focus on the venture capitalist’s ability to certify issues and reduce underpricing.1 Barry 
et al (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) pioneered the study of venture capital 
certification. The findings of those studies show that venture capitalists are able to 
credibly certify the quality of their issues through monitoring activities, with the end 
result being reduced underpricing. Additionally, Lin and Smith (1997) examine the roll of 
insider selling decisions on initial returns. They find that the selling of lead venture 
capitalists during the IPO period adversely affects underpricing of issues. Recent works 
in corporate finance studies have shown reversed results from previous studies. Gompers 
(1996) examines the phenomenon of grandstanding undertaken by younger venture 
capitalists in order to showcase financing talents. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) observe 
the effects of insider selling decisions on issuer underpricing in the context of bubble 
markets.  
 This study focuses on examining the strength of certification and insider selling 
hypotheses during the 1990s new issues market in the United States. Previous models call 
for certification by venture capitalists to decrease underpricing and insider selling to 
heighten underpricing during the first day of trading. The study employs a set of 1786 
venture capital backed issues and a set of 1531 non venture capital backed issues with 
similar offering characteristics from 1991-2001 to test the claims of certification. 
Additionally 1505 VC-backed issues from 1991-2001 are used to test insider selling 
                                                 
1 The terms underpricing and initial returns will be used interchangeably throughout the study. 
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decisions during the IPO period on subsequent initial returns.2 The results indicate that 
the presence of venture capitalists results in increased underpricing for issuers. Increased 
insider selling significantly decreases underpricing. 
 Specifically, the paper presents current research that may explain the differing 
results from previous studies. The grandstanding hypothesis developed by Gompers 
(1996) may explain systematic underpricing of venture-backed issues during the 1990s. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) use data from the hot market period of the late 1990s to 
explore incentives facing insiders’ selling decisions during the IPO period. They present 
evidence of insiders’ abilities to minimize underpricing in order to maximize gains from 
liquidation of holdings.  
 The paper is organized in the following fashion: Section 2 gives a general 
overview of the new issues environment in the United States from 1991-2001. Section 3 
outlines the literature related to both initial public offerings and venture capital 
certification. Section 4 describes the methodological approach for testing previous 
models. Section 5 presents the data used for testing. Section 6 provides the empirical 
results of the certification and insider selling test. Section 7 concludes. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Only 1505 issues with venture backing had pertinent information on insider selling during the IPO period. 
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II.  Overview of New Issues in the United States from 1991-2001 
 
 The market for Initial Public Offerings in the United States during the period from 
1991-2001 shows several underlying trends. The total number of issues tracked by 
Thomson SDC Global New Issues was 5997 during the time frame. Of that total, 1831 
had some form of venture capital backing, with the other 4166 not having pre-IPO 
relationships with venture capitalists.3 The frequency of issues during the time period 
shows intense periods of equity offerings, followed by years of calmer activity. The 
distribution of both venture capital backed and non venture capital backed IPOs gives 
insight into the concentration of venture capitalists’ efforts in a narrow set of industries. 
 
Table 1 
Frequency distribution of 5997 public  common eq uity IPOs from 1991-2001, 
including 1831 venture capital backed new  issues and 4166 w ithout venture capital 
backing. 
  
Venture Capital 
Backed Firms 
Firms without 
Venture Capital 
Backing 
Total Issues Percent of 
Venture Capital 
Backed Firms 
       
1991 149 252 401 37.16 
1992 197 409 606 32.51 
1993 230 587 817 28.15 
1994 146 497 643 22.71 
1995 180 397 577 31.20 
1996 268 606 874 30.66 
1997 128 503 631 20.29 
1998 63 329 392 16.07 
1999 232 308 540 42.96 
2000 218 169 387 56.33 
2001 20 109 129 15.50 
          
Totals 1831 4166 5997 30.53 
          
                                                 
3 Firms with private equity backing are not included in the same group as VC backed offerings. Since most 
private equity investments occur after a LBO or spin-off, these issues are not included with venture capital 
backed issues. This is done in order to focus on the financing issues surrounding early stage companies. 
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Table 1 shows no single underlying trend in IPO volume during the 1990s. New 
issues were at an all time high during 1993 and 1996.4 The low peaks for IPOs occurred 
in 1998, 1999, and 2001. The hot IPO issue periods followed bull market years.5 Total 
IPOs during 1993 and 1996 were 817 and 874, respectively. Market returns for 1992 and 
1995 were 4.46% and 34.1%, respectively. The market returns for the years preceding the 
low point for the total number of new issues (1998, 1999, 2001) were 31.5%, 26.6%, and 
10.0%, respectively. Financing of firms with venture capital backing was heavily 
concentrated in the latter part of the sample period. Venture capital backed new issues, 
measured as a percentage of all new issues, peaked during 1999 and 2000. These periods 
were preceded by hot market years. The returns on the market index during 1998 and 
1999 were 26.66% and 19.52%, respectively. Lerner (1994) argues that venture 
capitalists can accurately time the sale of new issues to coincide with hot markets. 
However, the low points for VC backed issues also follow years of strong market 
performance. The market returns preceding cool periods of VC backed issues were 
20.26% and 31%, respectively. 
 The largest number of offerings involved high technology firms (1395), followed 
by financial services (845), healthcare (777), consumer products and services (574), and 
industrials (493). Table 2 shows the entire breakdown of IPOs by industry. Barry (1990) 
                                                 
4 Note: This overview only addresses the total number of new issues. It does not take into account total 
issue size. The late 1990s saw several very large issues. 
 
5 All information on market returns is taken from Yahoo! Finance, using the S&P 500 Index as the 
“market” and December 2nd as end of fiscal year for calculations purposes. 
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suggests that venture capital firms concentrate their resources in a narrow set of 
industries.6 Indeed VC backed offerings during the period were most noticeably  
Table 2 
Industry distribution of 5996 IPOs between 1991-2001, including 1831 venture capital 
backed issues and 5996 issues without venture capital backing. 
  
 Firms without 
Venture Capital 
Backing 
Venture Capital 
Backed Firms 
Total Issues Percent of 
Industry Issues 
with VC Backing 
Percent of Total 
VC Issues 
High Technology 686 709 1395 0.508 0.387
Healthcare 373 404 777 0.520 0.221
Financials 803 42 845 0.050 0.023
Consumer Products and Svcs. 402 172 574 0.300 0.094
Materials 193 39 232 0.168 0.021
Industrials 400 93 493 0.189 0.051
Consumer Staples 204 34 238 0.143 0.019
Retail 267 92 359 0.256 0.050
Energy and Power 187 35 222 0.158 0.019
Media and Entertainment 273 60 333 0.180 0.033
Telecommunications 218 148 366 0.404 0.081
Real Estate 157 3 160 0.019 0.002
Government and Agencies 2 0 2 0.000 0.000
Total 4165 1831 5996   1
Note: The total of all new issues differs from the total listed in Table X due the lack of industry information on the issue that was excluded from this 
list. All information was obtained from the SDC database. 
 
concentrated in high technology and healthcare. VCs were involved with 50.8% of high 
tech issues and 52.0% of all healthcare issues. High technology, healthcare, and 
telecommunications comprise 68.9% off all venture-backed offers. Industries bereft of 
VC involvement include financial services, real estate, energy, consumer staples, and 
governmental agencies.  
 In summary, venture capital backed issues represented 30.5% of all new issues 
during the 1991-2001 period. Periods of intense venture capital involvement were 
preceded by years with large returns for the market index. Venture capital backed firms 
                                                 
6 The authors’ work shows that the largest industries with VC involvement include computer equipment, 
electronic components, and business services. The author used SIC codes to indicate issuer industry. 
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concentrated resources in high technology and healthcare companies, while shying away 
from financials, consumer staples, and energy.  
III.  Initial Public Offerings 
 
 The phenomenon of systematic underpricing has been a focal point of research in 
initial public offerings for quite some time. Much of the literature focuses on 
informational asymmetries facing investors, issuers, and third parties.7 Most of these 
studies attribute underpricing to adverse selection, principal-agent models, or signaling of 
firm quality. In this study I will only focus on an empirical implication of the Winner’s 
Curse. The outcome of the Winner’s Curse is that uninformed investors only receive 
allotments of shares in offerings that are overpriced (Rock, 1986). On average, the 
“winner” ends up receiving negative average returns.8 The author shows that some action 
is needed to induce uninformed investors to stay in the primary market. The end result is 
systematic underpricing of every issue in order to keep the uninformed investors from 
refusing to participate in the primary market of new issues. However, underpricing is 
very costly to issuers, since this is a net transfer of wealth from existing shareholders to 
new shareholders. Rock (1986) now goes on to show how the logic of deliberate 
underpricing eventually leads to the classic free rider problem. In order to ensure the 
future participation of uninformed investors, every issuer will have to deliberately 
underprice their own shares. No one issuer will face enough incentive to leave money on 
                                                 
7 Notably public auditors, underwriters, and venture capital firms.  
8 The underlying assumptions calls for both the underwriter and issuer to have information of the value of 
the shares, but are not able to credibly signal this to the market. Some investors are informed, while most 
remain uninformed as to the true value of the shares that are being offered. During an offering of 
attractively priced shares informed investors bid, along with the uninformed investors. The uninformed 
investors are crowded out and do not receive their total amount of bids during attractively priced offerings. 
In offerings that are not priced attractively, the informed investors refrain from bidding, with all of the 
shares going to the uninformed investors. On average, the uninformed investors only receive shares in 
overpriced companies. 
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the table in order to let future issuers benefit from this incremental cost faced by the 
current firm. Issuers are one-time players in an initial public offering game, while 
investors and third parties are repeat-players. Investment banks do face incentives to 
bring high quality issues to market, mainly through future business from issuers and 
increased market share from investors {see Nanda and Yun, 1997}.  
 One of the more popular proxies for uncertainty are offering characteristics of the 
issuer and certification of the issuer by third parties. Much effort has been concentrated in 
the effect of third parties on ex-ante uncertainty. Underwriters and venture capital firms 
may also signal firm quality through repeatedly participating in high quality offerings. 
Issuers can hire reputable auditors in order to reduce underpricing {see (Balvers et al., 
1988) and (Beatty, 1989)}. A pre-IPO equity investment undertaken by a venture capital 
fund may additionally result in less ex-ante uncertainty {see (Barry et al., 1990), 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991), and (Lin and Smith, 1997)}. Empirical research on the 
role of venture capital firms in the pricing of initial public offerings continues to remain 
as a research hotspot and warrants sufficient room for further investigation. 
  
A.  Venture Capital 
 
 The Venture Capital industry is an amalgam of limited partners, general partners, 
early stage companies, and, of course, money. VC firms provide sources of capital to 
risky ventures when more traditional forms of financing, namely banks and retail 
investors, are unavailable. Unlike mutual funds, venture capital funds are closed-end and 
not open to retail investors. The legal entity of choice for any venture capital firm is the 
limited liability corporation. The management team of any venture capital firm serves as 
general partners. The managing partners of any venture capital firm typically bring a 
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myriad of knowledge and expertise in a certain industry to the table. Savvy acumen is 
needed, since venture capitalists play a large role in development and strategic decision 
making for portfolio companies. This is where the venture capital firm differs from 
traditional money managers or investment funds. Venture capitalists take an active role in 
management of the company. They take seats on the board of directors and use their 
contacts in the specific industry in order to develop a client base and streamline 
operations. From an economic standpoint, a venture capitalist seeks to “add-value” to the 
firms in his or her portfolio.  
 There are three distinct stages to any venture capital investment. The cycle starts 
with the raising of capital that is invested in entrepreneurial ventures. Capital is usually 
provided by sophisticated investors such as wealthy individuals, institutional investors, 
and university endowment funds. The second stage of the cycle is the financing and 
active management of the funded venture. The venture capitalist takes an active role in 
managing the enterprise, monitoring performance, and partaking in any other value-added 
activities. The fund typically provides some form of staged financing to the enterprise. 
This is done in order to avert any agency problems faced between the principal (venture 
capitalist) and agent (entrepreneur) (Sahlman, 1990). The general partner in the fund 
must be compensated for both his active involvement in the company and the opportunity 
costs of not investing in other risky ventures. The final stage involves the process of 
unwinding investment in the business. The most common strategy used to liquidate the 
venture capitalists position is an initial public offering of the company’s shares on an 
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exchange (Gladstone, 1989).9 However, according to Barry (1990), companies often 
retain partial ownership in the issuer after the first day of trading on public markets in 
order to signal quality of the monitoring efforts There is no clear-cut rule in the 
investment community as to the ability of venture capitalists to time issues. However 
Lerner (1994) asserts that seasoned venture capital professionals possess and employ 
their abilities to take issues public in peak market conditions. 
 
B.  Venture Capitalist Certification Models 
 
The role of certification provided by Venture capitalists through reputation capital 
and monitoring efforts has been a major area of research in Initial Public offerings in the 
past fifteen years. The first study to analyze the role of venture capitalists in bringing new 
issues to the market was undertaken by Barry et al (1990). The authors of this body of 
work find that venture capitalists specialize in a narrow set of industries and are able to 
bring in better underwriters to the issuing process. They also hold significant positions in 
firms after the issuance on the primary market. This disagrees with Gladstone’s (1989) 
view that the IPO is an exit vehicle for VC firms. Finally, Barry states that the reputation 
and monitoring role undertaken by venture capitalists is recognized by the markets, 
resulting in lower underpricing. An interesting caveat to this study is the fact that VC-
backed issues do not have significantly lower initial returns than non-VC backed issues. 
However, the author noted that this is most probably due to the method of data collection 
of the firms that did not have relationships with venture capitalists pre-IPO.10 For the 
                                                 
9Gladstone (1989) outlines other forms of venture capital exits include sale of shares to other companies, 
share repurchases by company, reorganization of the company, liquidation of the company’s assets, or a 
private placement to another investor or a consortium.  
10 The authors used ads in the Wall Street Journal for non-venture capital backed firms. This sample may be 
biased towards large firms.  
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entire study the authors used a sample of 433 venture-backed and 1123 non venture-
backed issues in the United States from 1978-1987.  
 Another study by Megginson and Weiss (1991) shows that the certification role 
provided by VC firms results in lower underpricing. A treatment of means test and OLS 
regression both provide statistical evidence that VC-backed firms are subject to lower 
initial first-day returns than issuers without venture capital backing. The authors also 
show that venture capitalists can attract higher quality auditors and underwriters than 
non-VC backed firms.11 Additionally, venture capitalists refrain from selling after the 
IPO, this is consistent with Barry’s (1990) findings. For the data set the authors used 320 
VC-backed issues and a matched set of 320 non VC-backed issues from the US market in 
1983-1987. The data was matched to include issues from similar industries with similar 
offerings amounts.12  
 A third study provides convincing evidence for the reputation of venture capital 
firms in the role of pricing initial public offerings. Lin and Smith (1997) state that venture 
capitalists participate in relationships with younger issuers. These findings are consistent 
with Megginson and Weiss (1991). However, Lin and Smith’s findings show that VC-
backed issuers are less profitable and have fewer assets than issuers without venture 
capital backing. The authors find that venture capitalists’ marginal level of productivity 
diminishes as the age of the firm increases. Their evidence shows that they reduce equity 
positions in firms in order to redeploy their services to other firms. This disagrees with 
                                                 
11 Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that VCs develop reputations with underwriters and auditors. They 
continue to state that since venture capitalists have their reputation capital on the line, then they have 
incentive to reveal truthful information to the auditors and underwriters. This reduces the costs (due 
diligence and information gathering) to the auditors and underwriters. Therein lies the ability to attract 
higher quality third party players.  
12Every effort was made to exclude financial institutions, offerings less than $5 in price, and issues with 
total offering amounts less than $3 million. 
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both Barry (1991) and Megginson and Weiss (1991). However, Lin and Smith use a 3-
year horizon to measure ownership levels, whereas the other authors use immediate post-
IPO data. Finally, the authors show that the selling decisions of reputable lead venture 
capitalists influences the level of underpricing. When reputable lead investors elect not to 
sell during the IPO, underpricing is significantly lower than when reputable insiders 
choose to sell equity stakes. 
 All of the certification studies used data from new issues listed on US capital 
markets. Studies done with data from other countries show much different results and 
may provide startling evidence against the certification hypothesis of venture capital 
firms. A recent body of work by Hamao et al (2000) analyzes new public issues in 
Japanese markets to test the strength of the certification model.13 The results of the study 
are in stark contrast to the evidence that has been presented by Barry (1990), Megginson 
and Weiss (1991), and Lin and Smith (1997). Hamao (2000) finds that venture capital 
firms in Japan do not take an active monitoring role in portfolio companies14, hold 
smaller equity stakes in the invested firms, and do not face a heavy high technology bias 
when choosing companies for equity commitments. Additionally, Hamao (2000) finds 
that underpricing is significantly greater for venture-backed new issues. However, when 
the authors control certain variables15, the amount of underpricing is significantly 
                                                 
13 Much of the differences between the results of Barry (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Lin and 
Smith (1997) in relationship to the findings of Hamao (2000) may be attributed to structural organization of 
the venture capital industry in Japan. In the Japanese market, venture capital firms are not organized as 
partnerships. Instead, they are owned by banks, securities firms, and underwriters.  
14 The reason that venture capital firms do not take an active monitoring role in the portfolio companies is 
due to legal and statutory rules. These rules were changed after 1995.  
15 The controlled variables in the regression include: age (ln), amount of IPO proceeds (ln), market return 
of the OTC index from the first day of auction to the first day of trading, book equity to market value 
equity based on lower limit of bids (ln), and time period dummy variables.  
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decreased for firms with venture capital backing. Initial returns are significantly higher 
for VC-backed companies when the lead underwriter owns the venture capital firm.  
 A recent study on returns of US issues during the bubble period of the 1990s 
shines new light onto venture capitalists’ effects on new issue pricing. Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003) show that runaway underpricing during 1999 and 2000 can be explained 
by incentives faced by firms involved with the issues. While this study does not strictly 
focus on certification roles of venture capitalists, it does uncover new information on the 
relationship between insider selling decisions and underpricing. The results of the study 
show that increases in venture capital and insider selling during the issue period tend to 
reduce underpricing. This study uses data from 1996-2000. It is one of the first studies to 
analyze the role of VC’s during the hot market area of the last decade ending in 2000. 
Perhaps future findings might reveal a differing role of venture capitalists in hot markets. 
IV.  Analytical Framework 
 Asymmetric information is an underlying theme within modern IPO framework. 
Inside investors have incentive to hide or delay disclosure of material information that 
could hurt the price of the offering. Rational investors recognize this by submitting lower 
average offers for the prices of these securities. Only credible certification from a third 
party will prevent a market failure similar to that of the lemon car model. Enter venture 
capitalists. 
 Venture capital firms engage in costly activities that can add a sense of 
certification to the involved issuer. VCs face extreme risk-to-reward ratios, since they 
usually invest in emerging companies that are clustered within certain industries. The 
venture capitalist provides funding to the entrepreneurial venture in a series of rounds, 
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usually connected to different stages in the life of the business. However venture 
capitalists are more than just silent partners that use private businesses as an investment 
vehicle. Like leverage-buyout and private equity firms, they are heavily involved in the 
operational and strategic facets of an organization. VCs line-up suppliers, sit on the board 
of directors, and formulate business plans. They help “add-value” to their portfolio 
companies. Indeed, most venture capitalists have held operational and management 
positions within the industries that they cover. Since venture capitalists are heavily 
involved with the development of their respective issuers, they are able to credibly certify 
the financial status of the issuers. 
Venture capitalists are repeat players in the new issues market. They seek to add 
value to emerging technological ventures in order to reap the rewards of selling shares in 
open and liquid markets. Since VCs have to repeatedly face the same investors in capital 
markets, they need to develop relationships with these investors. Venture capital firms 
face strong incentives to invest in activities that lead to a favorable image amongst capital 
market participants, namely investors. The main ‘investment’ is avoiding the one-time 
gains of bringing overvalued companies public. Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that 
these one-time gains destroy part of the firm’s reputation capital. Venture capitalists seek 
to develop a reputation for selling high quality issues. Lin and Smith (1997) show that 
reputable firms forego participating in the sales of overpriced issues.  
Venture capital firms must eventually liquidate their holdings in the 
entrepreneurial ventures once they gain listing on a public exchange. VCs do not derive 
their competitive advantage or value-added services from monitoring the operations of 
established business. Their marginal productivity is highest when they are involved with 
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emerging companies. The services of venture capitalists are put to better use while 
engaging in monitoring activities of new firms, rather than just holding directorship 
positions with publicly traded companies. However, the selling decisions of venture 
capitalists during the IPO phase do not go unnoticed by capital market participants. Any 
selling during the offering can be negatively perceived and endanger the reputation 
capital of the VC. Lin and Smith (1997) argue that venture capital firms balance their 
selling decisions with the opportunity cost of not transferring their monitoring services 
and investment capital to other ventures. Ultimately, the selling decisions of venture 
capitalists during the new issue offering period have important ramifications for both the 
venture capitalist and issuers.  
 In summary, previous models show that the monitoring role (of venture 
capitalists) is noticed by capital markets participants and the selling decisions of venture 
capitalists and insiders can affect the pricing of new issues. These models yield two 
testable hypotheses: 
1) Since venture capitalists certify the quality of their issues, then firms that are 
backed by venture capital investors should face lower underpricing than firms 
without venture capital backing. 
2) The relative liquidation of insider holdings during the IPO process should 
adversely affect the pricing of the issue. Therefore, for issues where venture 
capitalists substantially reduce their holdings during the IPO process, the level 
of underpricing should increase. 
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V.  Data Selection 
 
For this study I used a set of 1786 venture capital backed issues and 1531 issues 
without venture capital financing from the period January 1, 1991 through December 31, 
2001 with primary listings on exchanges in the United States.16 The issues are closely 
matched on the basis of industry and offering amount. All of the primary data was 
obtained from Thomson SDC Platinum Global New Issues database. For the entire period 
(1/1/1991-12/31/01) SDC contained a total of 5997 new issues listed on U.S. markets. Of 
that set, 1831 were identified as having venture capital backing. This entire set of new 
issues proved too unwieldy for the testable hypotheses.  
Table 3 
Industry distribution of 3317 IPOs between 1991-2001, including 1786 venture 
capital backed issues and 1531 issues without venture capital backing. 
  Non-VC   VC Backed 
      
Industry Number % of Total   Number % of Total 
High Technology 543 0.355  709 0.397 
Healthcare 330 0.216  404 0.226 
Materials 38 0.025  39 0.022 
Industrials 90 0.059  93 0.052 
Consumer Prod. 171 0.112  172 0.096 
Consumer Staples 32 0.021  34 0.019 
Telecommunications 142 0.093  148 0.083 
Retail 90 0.059  92 0.052 
Energy and Power 35 0.023  35 0.020 
Media and Ent. 60 0.039   60 0.034 
Total 1531     1786   
Note: Financial services issues were excluded, along with offers under 5 million and offers over 400 million. 
 
Since venture capital backed firms’ first day returns tend to be clustered by 
industry (see Ritter (1984)), matching the samples by both offering size and industry 
would provide better results for testing the hypotheses. First, all IPOs that were classified 
                                                 
16 This includes the American Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, Nasdaq Small Cap Markets, New York Stock 
Exchange, and OTC traded issues. 
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as either financial services or real estate firms by the T-F Macro Industry list on SDC 
Global New Issues were eliminated.17 Secondly, only issues within the amount offered 
range of $5 million to $400 million were included. Finally, a set of 1786 VC-backed and 
1531 non VC-backed issues with similar offering amounts and industry affiliations were 
used to perform the testing. Table 3 shows distribution of issues by industry and Table 4 
shows the frequency distribution of IPOs by offer amount. For the testing on underpricing 
and selling decisions, 1505 VC-backed firms with available insider selling data were used 
(these firms were taken out of the previous set of 1786 VC-backed issues). 
Table 4 
Distribution of offering amounts for 1531 IPOs without venture-backing and 1786 
IPOs with venture-backing from 1991-2001, excluding financial services issues and 
those with offering amounts less than 5 million and greater than 400 million. All 
offer amounts in millions. 
    
Percentile   Non-VC   VC 
10th  15 15.8
20th  20 21.38
30th  25 25
40th  30 30
50th  35 33
60th  41.9 40
70th  50.1 48.92
80th  63.7 60
90th   87.5  82.5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 This follows the basic procedure used by Megginson and Weiss (1991). That study included a sample of 
320 non VC-backed and VC-backed issues listed on US markets between 1983-1987. Both sets were 
matched closely by industry and offering amount. All  
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VI. Empirical Results 
 
A.  Venture Capitalist Certification 
 
1. Regression Analysis 
 
Tests of the venture capital certification hypothesis and its application to first day returns 
are presented in Table 5. I examined the following variables and their relationship to the 
first day returns of new issues: 
 
(1) Venture Capital Dummy Variable (VC). 
Initial returns of VC backed firms (VC=1) should be lower than the returns of 
non VC-backed issues (VC=0). Since capital markets take into account the 
monitoring role of venture capital firms, there should be a negative and 
significant relationship between (VC) and first day returns. 
 
(2) Issue offering amount (AMOUNT). 
Controlling for size allows for a better relative measure of VC backing. 
 
(3) Industry Dummy Variables (IND1, IND2, IND3, IND4). 
The High Technology (IND1=1), healthcare (IND2=1), personal/business 
products and services (IND3=1), media (IND4=1), energy (IND5=1), retail 
(IND6=1), and materials (IND7=1) industries have been included in order to 
separate the effect of issuer industry on initial returns from that of venture 
capital certification. 
 
(4) Issue year dummy variables (YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4, YEAR5). 
Dummy variables are used in order to control for IPO and market activity 
within certain yearly trading sessions. Hot market periods, especially 1995-
199918, (YEAR5=1, YEAR6=1, YEAR7=1, YEAR8=1, YEAR9=1) were a 
boon for IPO first day returns. Therefore, those variables should be positively 
related to initial returns. Issues during bear markets (YEAR00=1, 
YEAR01=1) should have a negative correlation to initial returns, however, 
these could have either a significant or insignificant value. The issue dummy 
variables during other years (YEAR2=1, YEAR3=1, YEAR4=1) should have 
an insignificant relationship with initial returns. 
  
                                                 
18 The yearly returns for the S&P 500 during the ‘hot market’ periods of 1995-1999 were 34.1%, 20.26%, 
31%, 26.66%, and 19.52%, respectively.  The returns for the ‘bear market’ years of 2000 and 2001 were –
10.01% and –13.04%, respectively. The returns for the remaining years 1991-1994 were 21.12%, 4.46%, 
7.05%, and –1.5%, respectively. All yearly returns were calculated using December 2nd as year-end. All 
data was obtained from Yahoo Finance. 
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 Table 5 outlines the results of the statistical analyses of the effects of venture 
capital backing, offer amount, year of issue, and industry on underpricing of both 
venture-backed and non VC issues. The results show a reversal of the trends from prior  
 
Table 5 
OLS Regression results from Day 1 Returns (R1) against VC backing (TYPE), 
offering amount (OFFER), Year of Issue Indicators (YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR3, 
YEAR4, YEAR5), and Industry of Issuer Indicators (TYPE1, TYPE2, TYPE3, 
TYPE4, TYPE5, TYPE6) for the sample of 1786 VC backed firms and 1531 firms 
without venture capital backing. 
      
R1 = 
α0+α1TYPE+α2OFFER+α3YEAR1+α4YEAR2+α5YEAR3+α6YEAR4+α7YEAR5+α8IND1+α9IND2+α10IND3+
α11IND4+α12IND5+α12IND6+εi 
 
Dependent Var.: {1} {2} {3} {4} 
     
INTERCEPT 0.249 0.192 0.185 0.106 
 {16.575} {9.980} {8.121} {0.033} 
TYPE 0.077 0.079 0.067 0.058 
 {3.733} {3.859} {3.357} {2.943} 
OFFER  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  {4.745} {2.904} {2.629} 
YEAR1   -0.005 -0.017 
   {-0.143} {-0.495} 
YEAR2   -0.098 -0.091 
   {-3.491} {-3.291} 
YEAR3   -0.124 -0.130 
   {-3.778} {-4.009} 
YEAR4   -0.029 -0.058 
   {-0.687} {-1.381} 
YEAR5   0.522 0.460 
   {17.192} {15.016} 
IND1    0.203 
    {6.575} 
IND2    0.004 
    {0.114} 
IND3    -0.005 
    {-0.103} 
IND4    -0.087 
    {-1.278} 
IND5    0.197 
    {4.734} 
IND6    0.046 
    {1.162} 
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Adjusted R Squared 0.004 0.010 0.117 0.143 
R1=  Percentage return from offer price to closing price on first day of trading. 
HOLD= Percentage decrease in insider holdings during the IPO period.   
AMOUNT= Offering amount in millions. 
YEAR= Indicator (dummy) variables for various issue years (YEAR1 1995=1, non=0; YEAR2 1996=1, non=0; YEAR3 
1997=1, non=0; YEAR4 1998=1, non=0; YEAR5 1999=1, non=0). 
IND= Indicator (dummy) variables for various industries. (IND1 High Technology=1,non=0; IND2 
Healthcare=1,non=0; IND3 Retail=0, non=1; IND4 Materials=1, non=0; IND5 Telecommunications=1, non=0). 
All values significant at the .05 level. 
 
VC certification studies. Ultimately, the findings question the prior results of Barry 
(1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Lin and Smith (1997). 
 The most marked departure from previous work is the positive and significant 
coefficient attached to the venture capital indicator. This signifies that the presence of 
venture capitalists in the sample positively affected initial returns. The value remains 
significant after controlling for offer amount, year of issue, and industry of issuer. A 
treatment of means test reiterates these results.19 This completely contradicts the findings 
of Barry (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Lin and Smith (1997), all of whom 
outline reduced underpricing through certification. However, the results are consistent 
with Lee and Wahal (2002). One explanation for systematic underpricing of venture-
backed issues could possibly be widespread grandstanding. Gompers (1996) hypothesizes 
that young venture capital firms often face problems in raising capital for their funds, 
since their capabilities have not been demonstrated. In order to signal their abilities, they 
bring firms public at a younger age in order to showcase their talents in financing 
startups. Since these firms are brought to market at an earlier age, there is more 
surrounding uncertainty towards the issuer’s prospects resulting in more underpricing 
than normal. The author’s tests show that companies brought to market by younger VCs 
                                                 
19 The difference in mean initial returns between VC-backed and non-VC issues (.0774) is significant at the 
.05 level, showing that VC-backed issues have higher initial returns than non venture-backed issues. (t-stat: 
–7.66). 
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(those less than 3 years old) are, on average, younger and subject to higher initial returns. 
Perhaps the 1990s saw an influx of venture capital firms eager to bring new ideas to the 
market (internet concerns) and saw grandstanding as the only plausible way to establish a 
track record, with the result being widespread underpricing of venture capital backed 
issues. Additionally, the author states that positive performance of new issues provides 
more incentives for grandstanding. The work of Lee and Wahal (2002) attributes 
increasing initial returns for venture-backed firms to a variant of the grandstanding 
hypothesis. 
 The issuer’s offering amount significantly affects underpricing in the sample, 
differing from Lin and Smith (1997). Year of issue and industry influenced firm 
underpricing. The indicators for 1996 and 1997 were negative and significant. Three 
other indicator variables provide some insight into the underpricing of issues during the 
test period. The coefficient on the control variable for issues in 1999 is positive and 
significant.20 In their study, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) state that the rampant 
underpricing of the late 90s may be attributed to the difficulty of valuing new economy 
issues.21 Additionally, the indicator variable for high tech and telecommunications 
companies is positive and significant. This could suggest that these companies are subject 
to greater first day returns than other industries. Since many of the companies in 
Ljungqvists’s (2003) valuation problem are internet firms, this result pays credence to the 
authors’ study. 
                                                 
20 The coefficient remains significant when controlling for issuer industry. See Table 5 for complete results 
of the OLS Regression on initial returns. 
21 The authors conclude that certain omitted variables in their tests may explain the level of underpricing in 
the bubble markets of the late 1990s. They explain that the issuers during this period chose an IPO as a 
means to raise capital for operational activities. This is different from the reasons that firms choose to go 
public in prior markets. As a result, investors may find it more difficult to value such issues.  
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Tests of the sample indicate that the certification effect of venture capitalists 
disappears during the period of the 1990s. This goes directly against the previous studies 
on initial public offerings and venture capital involvement. One possible explanation for 
the higher initial returns of VC-backed issues could be extensive grandstanding during 
the 1990s. 
  
B.  Underpricing and Insider Selling Decisions 
 
1.  Regression Analysis 
 
Tests of the selling decisions of venture capitalists during the IPO period and 
subsequent effects on first day returns are presented in Table 6. I examined the following 
variables and their relationship to the first day returns of new issues: 
 
 (1)   Reduction in insider holdings during IPO period (SELL). 
The percentage reduction of insider holdings during the IPO period. This 
variable analyzes the relationship between the selling decisions of venture 
capitalists and the subsequent effect on initial returns. Lin and Smith 
(1997) show that initial underpricing is reduced when reputable lead 
managers refrain from selling. Therefore, there should be a negative 
relationship between (SELL) and initial returns. 
 
 (2) Offer amount of issuer, in millions of dollars (OFFER). 
Controlling for size allows for a better relative measure of VC backing. 
 
(3) Industry Dummy Variables (IND1, IND2, IND3, IND4). 
The High Technology (IND1=1), healthcare (IND2=1), personal/business 
products and services (IND3=1), media (IND4=1), energy (IND5=1), 
retail (IND6=1), and materials (IND7=1) industries have been included in 
order to separate the effect of issuer industry on initial returns from that of 
venture capital certification. 
 
(4) Issue year dummy variables (YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4, YEAR5). 
Dummy variables are used in order to control for IPO and market activity 
within certain yearly trading sessions. Hot market periods, especially 
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1995-199922, (YEAR5=1, YEAR6=1, YEAR7=1, YEAR8=1, YEAR9=1) 
were a boon for IPO first day returns. Therefore, those variables should be 
positively related to initial returns.  
 
 
 
 Table 6 shows results that diverge from previous studies that document the 
relationship between insider selling and initial returns of new offerings. These results 
generally differ from the work of Lin and Smith (1997) in the area of venture capital 
selling decisions. However, the results show similarities to the recent findings of 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). 
 In all of the regression tests, the coefficient on the insider selling variable is 
positive and significant. This shows that for issues with a higher level of reduction of 
insider holdings, undepricing is actually reduced. Additionally, the coefficient decreases 
as more control variables are added, suggesting that underpricing is dependent upon a 
larger amount of factors than just insider selling decisions. Regardless of controlling for 
hot market periods and industry of issuer, a larger amount of insider selling significantly 
decreases the amount of underpricing. This is in stark contrast to previous studies in the 
selling decisions of venture capitalists. Lin and Smith (1997) show that underpricing is  
reduced when the lead venture capitalist refrains from liquidating its equity position in 
the issue. As previously noted, the results are consistent with tests of issues from the hot 
market period of the 1990s. The Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) empirical tests identify 
the fact that insider (especially Venture Capital) selling reduces underpricing in hot 
                                                 
22 The yearly returns for the S&P 500 during the ‘hot market’ periods of 1995-1999 were 34.1%, 20.26%, 
31%, 26.66%, and 19.52%, respectively.  The returns for the ‘bear market’ years of 2000 and 2001 were –
10.01% and –13.04%, respectively. The returns for the remaining years 1991-1994 were 21.12%, 4.46%, 
7.05%, and –1.5%, respectively. All yearly returns were calculated using December 2nd as year-end. All 
data was obtained from Yahoo Finance. 
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markets. The logic behind reduced underpricing and greater liquidation of insider 
holdings rests with the incentives faced by insiders. The author assumes that venture 
capitalists and insiders are able to influence the offering price of shares. Since  
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Table 6 
Results of OLS Regressions of First Day Returns (R1) against the Decrease in Insiders’ 
Holdings (HOLD), the Offering Amount of the Issuer (AMOUNT), Year of Issue Indicators 
(YEAR1,YEAR2,YEAR3,YEAR4,YEAR5), and Issuer Industry Indicators 
(IND1,IND2,IND3,IND4,IND5) 
For the sample of 1505 VC Backed Initial Public Offerings during the period 1/1/1991-
12/31-2001. 
 
R1=α0+α1HOLD+α2AMOUNT+α3YEAR1+α4YEAR2+α5YEAR3+α6YEAR4+α7YEAR5+α8IND1+α9IND2+α10IND
3+α11IND4+α12IND5+εi 
 
 
Regression INTERCEPT HOLD AMOUNT YEAR1 YEAR2 YEAR3 YEAR4 YEAR5 IND1 IND2 IND3 IND4 IND5 R2 
               
{1} 0.5612 0.8512            0.0512
 [18.702] [9.002]             
               
{2} 0.4567 0.7937 0.0020           0.0649
 [12.294] [8.3812] [4.7062]            
               
{3} 0.3753 0.6100 0.0010 0.0292 -0.0980 -0.0955 0.0342 0.6761      0.2063
 [9.7402] [6.9122] [2.6618] [.5793] [-2.2371] [-1.6817] [.4283] [14.8486]       
               
{4} 0.2902 0.5319 0.0011 0.0114 -0.0950 -0.1203 0.0033 0.6205 0.1721 -0.0328 -0.0222 -0.1000 0.0961 0.2262
 [5.9196] [6.0129] [2.9275] [0.2295] [-2.2748] [-1.8189] [0.0420] [13.4932] [4.3934] [-0.7270] [-0.3138] [-0.9707] [1.6455]  
               
                              
 
R1=  Percentage return from offer price to closing price on first day of trading. 
HOLD=  Percentage decrease in insider holdings during the IPO period.   
AMOUNT= Offering amount in millions. 
YEAR= Indicator (dummy) variables for various issue years (YEAR1 1995=1, non=0; YEAR2 1996=1, non=0; YEAR3 1997=1, 
non=0; YEAR4 1998=1, non=0; YEAR5 1999=1, non=0). 
IND= Indicator (dummy) variables for various industries. (IND1 High Technology=1,non=0; IND2 Healthcare=1,non=0; IND3 
Retail=0, non=1; IND4 Materials=1, non=0; IND5 Telecommunications=1, non=0). 
All values significant at the .05 level. 
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underpricing is costly to insiders (transfer of wealth from existing to new shareholders),   
venture capitalists have an incentive to increase the offering price when they plan to cash 
out their holdings during the IPO period. Thus, insider selling results in reduced 
underpricing. 
 The offering amount of firms is significant and affects the amount of initial 
returns for new issues. In all three equations the coefficient on amount offered is positive 
and significant. This differs from Megginson and Weiss (1991), who show that offering 
amounts of companies do not significantly affect initial returns. As in the underpricing 
analysis, the indicators for 1999 and high technology were significant and positive. 
 The results from the ordinary least squares regression show that the selling 
decisions positively affect underpricing. In other words, when venture capitalists choose 
to sell a larger amount of holdings in the issuer during the IPO period, underpricing is 
lowered when controlling for year of issue, offering amount, and industry of the issuer. 
The departure from previous studies can be explained by a recent analysis of 
underpricing in the bubble market of the late 1990s. 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 The results of this paper provide evidence that the certification models may not 
hold up under the hot market conditions of the 1990s. Tests on both non venture-backed 
and venture-backed offerings with similar characteristics show that underpricing 
increases with the presence of venture capitalists. These results are upheld when 
controlling for certain factors such as offering amount, industry affiliation, and year of 
offering. Positive market performance and increases in incentives for grandstanding by 
  
 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
27
younger venture capital firms may explain some of the increase in initial returns for 
venture-backed firms during the last decade. The grandstanding hypothesis has garnered 
the attention of academics in recent years and should remain a bountiful source of future 
study. More research in the area of increased capital infusions to venture capital funds 
through grandstanding is needed in order to plausibly explain for the amount of 
underpricing facing venture-backed issues in the 1990s. 
 The insider selling hypothesis which predicts that increased lead venture capitalist 
selling results in increased underpricing also does not hold up under the data from the 
1990s. Conversely, firms with increased venture capital selling during the IPO period 
realized lower underpicing. Venture capitalists and other insiders can influence the 
offering price of their issues and have incentive to price the issues higher when 
liquidating their holdings, thus reducing costly underpricing occuring in the primary 
market. 
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